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How	wealthy	lobby	groups	benefit	from	a	silent	media
Affluent	interest	groups	are	often	said	to	enjoy	a	greater	capacity	to	influence	policy	when
compared	to	economically	deprived	groups.	Yet,	academic	studies	find	no	consensus
about	the	validity	of	this	commonly	held	belief.	Drawing	on	a	new	study,	Frederik
Stevens	and	Iskander	De	Bruycker	suggest	that	the	role	of	economic	resources	for
lobbying	influence	is	mediated	by	the	attention	that	policy	issues	attract	in	the	news
media.	Their	study	shows	that	wealthy	lobby	groups	are	indeed	more	influential	on	EU
policies,	but	their	competitive	advantage	disappears	for	issues	which	are	highly	salient	in	the	news	media.
Do	economic	resources	enable	interest	groups	to	influence	democratic	decision-making?	One	answer	to	this
question	is	that	by	mobilising	their	financial	resources,	wealthy	lobby	groups	can	tip	the	scales	of	policymaking	in
their	favour,	often	at	the	expense	of	citizen	interests.	Intuitively,	the	idea	that	economic	resources	increase	a	lobby
group’s	influencing	capacity	makes	sense.	At	the	very	least,	money	enables	lobby	groups	to	hire	personnel	who	in
turn	can	collect,	process	and	communicate	valuable	information	to	policymakers.	However,	several	studies	paint	a
more	complicated	picture.	Often,	lobbyists	with	the	most	financial	backing	fail	to	procure	meaningful	policy	victories.
Think	about	the	failure	of	TTIP,	which	was	backed	by	big	business	on	both	sides	of	the	Atlantic.	So,	it	appears	that
spending	more	money	does	not	always	result	in	more	policy	influence.
The	role	of	media	attention
Has	the	importance	of	money	for	policy	influence	been	overstated?	Arguably,	it	depends	on	the	context	in	which
economic	resources	are	spent.	In	a	recent	study,	we	show	that	media	attention	to	policy	issues	will	determine
whether	wealthy	interest	groups	wield	disproportionate	influence.	If	a	policy	issue	is	mostly	discussed	behind	the
scenes	and	key	stakeholders	and	the	news	media	remain	‘quiet’,	rich	lobby	groups	find	it	easier	to	affect	EU	policy
outcomes.	This	is	because	decision-makers	have	little	to	gain	and	much	to	lose	by	opposing	economically
resourceful	groups	on	quiet	issues,	as	they	depend	on	such	groups	for	getting	relevant	expert	information.
However,	less	wealthy	groups	can	try	and	punch	above	their	weight	once	media	attention	increases.	Power
distributions	may	shift	and	tilt	once	a	conflict	expands	and	a	broader	array	of	stakeholders	becomes	involved.
Under	such	circumstances,	other	types	of	policy	resources	become	more	important	for	policymakers.	For	policy
issues	attracting	high	levels	of	media	attention,	policymakers	will	prefer	political	over	technical	information.	And,
whereas	expert	information	is	mostly	acquired	with	economic	resources,	gathering	political	information	is	often	less
expensive.	When	fighting	a	lobbying	battle	in	the	public	spotlight,	the	ability	to	speak	on	behalf	of	the	broader
public,	to	devise	catchy	slogans	and	mobilise	grassroots	campaigns	becomes	more	important	than	lobbyists’
economic	capacities.
The	European	context
Our	research	focuses	on	the	European	Union.	This	case	provides	a	particularly	relevant	setting	given	the	criticism
regarding	its	democratic	deficit.	Eurosceptics	regularly	point	towards	the	EU’s	accountability	gap	and	the
opaqueness	of	its	allegedly	elite-driven	policies.	Several	scholars	have	substantiated	this	critique	by	demonstrating
that	wealthy	business	organisations	more	easily	gain	access	to	EU	decision-making	bodies.	Subsequently,	we
investigated	whether	wealthy	interest	groups	also	wield	disproportionate	control	over	EU	policy	outcomes.
The	setting	of	the	EU	is	also	promising	to	test	our	expectations	as	these	increasingly	critical	voices	go	hand	in	hand
with	the	need	for	a	strong	trans-European	civil	society.	Moreover,	the	EU	–	and	the	European	Commission	in
particular	–	has	a	broad	policy	agenda	but	limited	policy	resources	causing	a	greater	dependency	on	information
exchanges	with	resourceful	interest	groups.
Measuring	influence
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We	assembled	data	on	41	policy	issues	in	the	European	Union	and	sent	out	a	survey	to	those	interest	groups
active	on	at	least	one	of	the	issues	in	the	period	between	June	2017	and	August	2018.	In	total,	183	lobbyists
reported	whether	their	organisation	was	able	to	significantly	impact	EU	decision-making	on	the	particular	issue.	We
combined	this	self-perception	measurement	with	an	attributed	measure	of	influence	by	asking	them	which	other
lobby	groups	were	influential	on	the	issue.	When	combined,	these	measures	should	provide	an	accurate	depiction
of	whether	a	group	exerted	control	over	policy	outputs.	This	two-sided	approach	allowed	us	to	answer	the	following
questions:	do	interest	groups	perceive	themselves	as	influential	on	a	policy	issue,	and	does	this	perception
correspond	with	the	perceptions	of	other	groups	active	on	the	issue?	The	European	Environmental	Bureau,
Business	Europe	and	Copa-Cogeca	were	identified	as	the	most	influential	lobby	groups	in	our	database.
Figure	1:	Relationship	between	economic	resources	and	influence	for	different	degrees	of	media	attention
Note:	For	more	information,	see	the	authors’	accompanying	paper	at	European	Union	Politics
We	ran	a	regression	analysis	with	the	dependent	variable	being	whether	groups	are	both	considered	by	themselves
and	at	least	one	other	stakeholder	as	influential.	We	controlled	for	several	alternative	explanations	such	as	the
importance	of	the	issue	to	the	group,	the	type	of	interests	they	represent,	their	policy	position,	their	access	to	the
media,	their	possible	coalition	membership	and	the	intensity	of	group	mobilisation	on	the	issue.	While	controlling	for
all	these	factors,	we	still	found	that	economic	resources	lead	to	more	influence	on	quiet	issues.	The	relationship
between	economic	resources	and	media	salience	is	portrayed	in	Figure	1.	For	instance,	we	see	that	groups	with
only	one	staff	member	have	a	3%	probability	to	be	influential	while	interest	groups	with	50	staff	members	have	a
70%	probability	of	being	influential	on	quiet	issues.
However,	it	appears	that	media	attention	empowers	less	resourceful	groups.	For	issues	that	are	highly	salient	in	the
media,	interest	groups	with	only	one	staff	member	have	a	25%	probability	of	being	influential,	while	interest	groups
with	50	staff	members	even	have	a	much	lower	probability	of	being	influential	(7%).	This	finding	is	well	illustrated	by
the	highly	salient	financial	transactions	tax	(FTT)	issue.	The	wealthy	European	Savings	and	Retail	Banking	Group
(with	more	than	30	staff	members	in	their	Brussels’	office)	was	not	influential	on	the	FTT	issue.	Meanwhile,	the
much	less	economically	resourceful	European	Network	on	Debt	and	Development	(with	only	five	staff	members)
was	able	to	significantly	impact	the	EU’s	decision-making	process	on	this	salient	issue.
Interest	representation	and	policymaking
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We	conclude	that	low	media	attention	offers	significant	opportunities	for	affluent	lobby	groups	to	reap	the	political
fruits	of	their	economic	wealth.	If	democratic	states	are	interested	in	combating	the	disproportionate	power	of
wealthy	lobby	groups	on	particular	issues,	then	it	is	critical	that	these	issues	become	more	visible	in	the	news
media.	In	reality,	we	demonstrate	that	media	attention	and	public	scrutiny	of	policy	issues	can	counterbalance	the
role	of	economic	resources	for	political	influence.	Especially	in	an	increasingly	mediated	world,	these	findings	may
offer	nuance	to	the	popular	concern	that	money	buys	power.
For	more	information,	see	the	authors’	accompanying	paper	at	European	Union	Politics
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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